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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LATIN AMERICA
KEITH S. ROSENN*
A region of chronic political instability1 and short-lived constitutions2
with a civil law tradition3 would appear most infertile soil for the seeds
of Marbury v. Aadison4 to take root. Yet all of the Latin American re-
publics,5 with the exception of the Dominican Republic,' provide for some
form of judicial review. To be sure, in some Latin American countries
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. The author wishes to thank Ms. Maria
Codinach, a second year student at the Ohio State University College of Law, for her assistance
with the notes to this article.
1 In the last forty-five years alone Latin American nations have had more than 100 successful
coups d'itat, as well as several times as many unsuccessful coups. The chronology and fre-
quency of the successful ones are depicted in K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOP-
MENT IN LATIN AMERICA, Chap. II, Table I (in press).
2 Calculating the number of constitutions which have been in force in Latin America is a
perplexing task, for it is often difficult to tell whether a particular constitution was ever in
force, or whether a constitution should be regarded merely as an amendment or as a new con-
stitution. Moreover, previously abrogated constitutions are occasionally resuscitated. Pro-
fessor Russell Fitzgibbon's latest count of constitutions which have been in force in the twenty
Latin American republics totals 247, an average of more than twelve per country. R. FrTZ-
GIBBON, LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: TEXTUAL CITATIONS 3 (1974).
3 See generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUC'ION TO THE
I-GAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1969).
4 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
5 For the purposes of this article, "Latin American republics" is used to refer only to the
twenty republics which traditionally make up the region known as Latin America: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
6Judicial review was abolished in the Dominican Republic in the 1947 Constitution.
though in practice Trujil!o had effectively eliminated the institution long before. Eder, Judi-
cial Review in Latin America, 21 OHIo ST. LJ. 5'10, 596 (1960). The present Constitution
makes no attempt to revive the practice of judicial review.
Ecuador should perhaps be included with the Dominican Republic, but the constitutional
situation in that country is confusing. Ecuador has historically confined the Supreme Court's
power to declare laws unconstitutional to procedural defects in enactment or promulgation.
Only the legislature has had the power to declare a statute unconstitutional for substantive
reasons, a declaration which is functionally indistinguishable from repeal. G. BLANKSrEN,
ECUADOR: CONSTITUTIONS AND CAUDILLOS 137-38 (1951). Ecuador's 1967 Constitution
created a constitutional court, but its opinions declaring statutes unconstitutional were merely
advisory. Arts. 219-22. In addition, the Supreme Court had the power to suspend, either
on its own initiative or in response to petition, any law or decree considered unconstitutional
on procedural or substantive grounds, pending submission to Congress for final decision. Art.
205(4). Article 257 stated explicitly that "Congress alone has the power to interpret the Con-
stitution in an obligatory manner .... " In 1970 President Velasco Ibarra promulgated several
controversial decrees concerning tax and fiscal reform. When the court declared them un-
constitutional, Velasco abrogated the 1967 Constitution, reformed the Supreme Court, and
seized dictatorial powers. He also reinstated the 1946 Constitution. Velasco was ousted in
February of 1972 by a military coup. See J. MARTz, ECUADOR: CONFLICTING POLITICAL
CULTURE AND THE QUEST FOR PROGRESS 80, 86-88 (1972). The military has reinstated
the 1945 Constitution. Decreto Supremo No. 1 (1972).
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such provisions have-not been effectively implemented; however, in a size-
able number of these countries, judicial review constitutes an important
component of the "law in action."
The procedures for judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and
decrees display considerable diversity and ingenuity in adapting an Anglo-
American legal institution 7 to the demands of Latin American legal cul-
ture. This article will compare the variety of techniques of judicial re-
view in the formal legal systems of Latin America, analyze the function-
ing of the most important of these techniques, and conclude with an
attempt to explain the significance of judicial review in Latin America.
7 Judicial review is hardly an Ang!o-American invention. There arc several important
historical analogues to judicial review in the civil law world. The ancient Athenians made it a
crime to secure passage of a statu:e which contravened fundamental norms (an intriguing the-
ory of criminality perhaps worthy of resuscitation), and Athenian judges were obligated to ap-
ply only those statutes consistent with higher law. The action to invalidate the statute was
known as the graphs parandmon; it could be brought by any citizen at any time. 2 R. BONNER
& G. SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE .FROM HOMER To ARISTOTLE 290, 296-97
(1938); Radin, The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 112.13
(1934).
During the twelfth century the Spanish kingdom of Arag6n developed an intriguing in-
stitution known as the Justiciar (Justicia), embodied in the presiding judge of the king's highest
court. The Justiciar was charged with the responsibility for prote:ting the populace from arbi-
trary or unlawful governmental actions, such as torture, illegal taxation, or secret trials and
imprisonment, in violation of the fueros. The fueros were quasi-constitutional charters con-
taining legal rights and privileges granted by the crown to various corporate groups or munici.
palities. Anyone who considered himself wrongfully apprehended for a crime or feared
mis'reatment from his jailors could apply to the Justiciar for a manifestacidn, a writ resembling
habeas corpus. Issuance of the writ resulted in the prisoner's being held in a special prison
until the Justiciar could determine the truth of the charge. The Justiciar also had the
power to issue a firma de derecho, a combination s:ay and appeal, to protect the lives and
property of applicants from illegal or "unconstitutional" (in the sense they violated a ludro)
judgments. 1 R. MERRIMAN, THE RISE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE 470 (1918). The office
of the Justiciar reached the peak of its power and independence during the 15th century, when
it became hereditary. Thereafter, its usefulness and prestige in curbing royal arbitrariness de-
clined sharply. See R. GIESEY, IF NOT, NOT: THE OATH OF THE ARAGONESE AND THE
LEGENDARY LAWS OF THE SOBRARBE 65-68 (1968). Its independence disappeared complete-
ly under Philip II when Antonio Prez, the unfortunate occupant of the office, literally lost his
head.
I Judges of the French Parlements, particularly in Paris, for a comparatively short period pre-
ceding the French Revolution asserted the power to refuse to effectuate royal ordinances which
the judges believed to violate fundamental law. F. OLIVIER-MARTIN, 1ISTOIR13 DU DROIT
FRANCAIS DES ORIGINES A LA RVOLUTION 541-552 (1948).
But these examples from civil law countries influenced the evolution of judicial review in
Latin America little, if at all. Some Mexican writers claim that the seed of the Justiciar has
flowered in the Mexican amparo, but the claim is highly dubious. See R. BAKER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN MExIco: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT 28-33 (197 1). The judges ol the French
Parlements were bitter enemies of the French Revolution, and their misust of offik has left a
legacy of hostility to judicial review that has not yet spent itself in Fram. And the graphbi
parandmon appears to have vanished without trace.
On the other hand, the influence of the United Siates experience with judkial review has
been direct and substantial. E. VESCOVI, EL l'ROCESO Dr INCONSTIT'( IONALIDAD DI: LA
LinY 27(1967). Cf. Eder, Judicial Review in Latin America, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 570 (1960).
JUDICIAL REVIEW
I. CENTRALIZATION OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT VERSUS THE REGULAR JUDICIARY
A recent comparative analysis of judicial review by Mauro Cappelletti,
one of Italy's most distinguished legal scholars, distinguishes between two
broad types of judicial review: "decentralized" and "centralized."" The de-
centralized system, whose prototype is found in the United States, entrusts
the power to determine the constitutionality of legislation to the entire
regular judiciary. The centralized system, whose prototype is delineated
in the Austrian Constitution of 1920, restricts exercise of this power to a
special constitutional court.
The two systems differ not only as to which courts exercise the power
of judicial review, but also as to techniques for raising constitutional ques-
tions and effects produced by judicial determinations of unconstitutional-
ity. The decentralized system restricts the exercise of judicial review to
the determination of real, concrete cases tendered by the parties in the
ordinary course of litigation ("review incidenter'). The centralized sys-
tem, at least in its archetypal form, divorces judicial review from ordinary
litigation, restricting presentation of constitutional issues to special, ab-
stract proceedings brought by various governmental agencies directly be-
fore a constitutional court ("review principaliter')
Under a centralized system, a judicial determination that a statute is
unconstitutional has an erga omnes effect. The law is invalidated for
everyone, just as if it had been abrogated by a subsequent statute.10 Un-
der a decentralized system, the effect of a determination of unconstitu-
tionality is more complex. Technically, a declaration of unconstitutional-
ity has only an inter partes effect in a decentralized system, though the
principle of stare decisis and the increasing popularity of class actions,
as a practical matter, may give the decision an effect so widespread that
it approaches being erga omnes.
Professor Cappelletti views the development of centralized judicial
review as a response to essentially three difficulties which civil law coun-
tries have experienced in attempting to implement decentralized judicial
review. First, the civil law countries have adhered more rigidly to the
doctrine of the separation of powers. Declaring legislation unconstitu-
tional is perceived as a political function and therefore unsuitable for the
ordinary judiciary. Second, the civil law countries have no developed
doctrine of stare decisis. Therefore, each person affected by an uncon-
stitutional statute might have to bring his own action, creating numerous
8 X CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 46 (197 1).
9Id. at 69.
20 Id. at 85.
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opportunities for conflicting opinions. Third, the traditional civil law
judiciary is unsuited to the exercise of the power of judicial review. Su-
preme courts in civil law countries tend to be large and unwieldy, with
multiple divisions. Their membership usually consists of career judges,
who lack broad political and policy-making experience. Moreover, these
courts are handicapped procedurally by the lack of discretionary power to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction."1
But the great bulk of the Latin American countries fall into neither
the centralized nor the decentralized camp. Rather, they are curious
hybrids, reflecting the persistence of the United States model, the diffi.
culties of implementing such a model in civil law countries, and the spe-
cial difficulties of launching constitutionalism in the Latin American
ambiente.
A. The Locus of the Power of Judicial Review
The decentralized practice of entrusting the power of judicial review
to the entire regular judiciary is followed in only five Latin American na-
tions: Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Venezuela, and, to a limited extent,
Colombia.12 Mexico is unique in conferring the power of judicial review
i Id. at 54-64.
1 2 BRAZIL CONST. OF 1969, art. 116; But see, arts. 480-82 of Law No. 5869 of Jan. 11,
1973. EL SALVADOR CONSr. OF 1962, arts. 81 and 95. The power of judicial review Is im-
plicit in the Argentine Constitution though explicit in the provincial constitutions. Eder,
supra note 6, at 576. The Supreme Court has held that even justices of the peace have the
power to declare laws unconstitutional. S. AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSI1TUTIONAL LAW
73 (1943).
Though Article 215 (3) of Venezuela's 1961 Constitution may appear to confine the power
of judicial review to the Supreme Court, Article 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1916,
which is still in force, directs the lower courts to pass on the constitutionality of legislation
when the issue is raised in the course of litigation. See H. Fix ZAMUDIO, VEINTICINco ANOS
DI EVOLUCION DE LA JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL 1940-1965 39 (1968).
Whether Colombia's lower ordinary courts can exercise the power of judicial review is not
entirely clear, for Articles 214 and 215 of the Constitution of 1886 (as amended) seem to
point in opposite directions.
Article 214 provides:
The guardianship of the integrity of the Constitution is entrusted to the Supreme
Court....
Article 215 provides:
In all cases of conflict between the Constitution and a law, preference shall be
given to the constitutional provision.
Colombian constitutional scholars are split as to whether judicial review by the lower courts
is constitutionally authorized. See L SACHICA, CONSTITUCIONALISMO COLOMI31ANO 134-135
(2d ed. 1966); 2 E. BOTERO, LAS CONSTITUCIONES COLOMBIANAS COMPARADAS 469.470
(1964).
North American scholars report that constitutional questions can be raised in ordinary liti-
gation before all courts, but that this method is seldom used because of the ready availability of
the popular action, discussed infra, no:es 89-91 and the text thereto. Grant, Judicial Control
of the Constitutionality of Statutes and Administrative Legislation in Colombia: Nature and
Evolution of the Present System, 23 SO. CALIF. L REV. 484, 485-486 (1950); Eder, iupra
note 6, at 591. Colombia also differs from the other decentralized countries in that the power
[Vol. 35
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on the entire federal judiciary, but denying such power to the state judi-
ciary.1
3
The centralized model has only one adherent. Several countries have
experimented with special constitutional tribunals," but only Guatemala
currently entrusts to a constitutional court exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine the constitutionality of legislation.'
The majority of the Latin American countries fall between the two
models. Eight countries-Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras,
Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay-have lodged the power of judicial re-
view exclusively in the highest court of the ordinary judiciary.1 How-
ever, actual exercise of that power is virtually non-existent in Bolivia,
Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay.
to declare governmental decrees unconstitutional has been lodged exclusively in the Adminis-
trative Tribunals. CONST. of 1886, art, 216.
13 J. GRANT, EL CONTROL JURISDICCONAL DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYEs
56-57 (1963).
14 From 1940 to 1959 Cuba had a court, known as the Tribunal of Social and Constitutional
Guarantees, which rendered advisory opinions on constitutional questions and decided consti.
rutional issues referred to it by the ordinary courts. This Tribunal (actually a division of the
regular Supreme Court), as well as the principle of judicial review, were formally retained by
Castro's revolutionary regime. Ley Fundtmnt-al de la Repdblica, arts. 152(d) and 160 (1959).
However, in practice, no semblance of judicial review remains. See AREA HANDBOOK FOR
CUBA 217-19, 421-24 (1971).
The Allende regime created a constitutional court in Chile in 1970 to facilitate implanta-
tion of a socialist regime by constitutional means. (Law of Jan. 23, 1970, No. 17.284, subse-
quently incorporated into the Chilean Constitution as articles 78a-c). The constitutional court
consisted of five ministers, three appointed by the President and two by the Supreme Court.
The constitutional court was to determine, inter alia, the cons:itutionality of bills submitted to
Congress and decrees with the force of law issued by the President. Dispositions declared un-
constitutional by the Court could not be made law, and those declared constitutional by the Court
could not later be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
After Allende's ill-fared regime was overthrown in September, 1973, the governing mili-
tary junta disbanded the Chilean Constitutional Court on the ground that it was no longer
needed. 7 LATIN AMERICA 368 (1973).
Ecuador created a "constitutional court" for the first time in 1945, but its powers to declare
laws unconstitutional were severely circumscribed. In 1946 this tribunal was more appropri-
ately retitled the Council of State. See Fix ZAMUDIO, supra note 12, at 49. From 1967 to
1970 this tribunal was again called a constitutional court, though it lacked the powers normally
associated with such a court. Presumably the 1972 reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution has
revived the 1945 "Constitutional court." See note 6 supra.
1-5 Guatemala's constitutional court, a creation of the 1965 Constitution, deviates from the
classic centralized model to the extent that its membership is drawn from the ordinary judiciary.
The constitutional court is made up of twelve judges: five drawn from the Supreme Court and
seven from two lower courts. Actions to declare a stature unconstitutional may be brought by
the Council of State, the Bar Association, the Public Ministry, or a per-on aggrieved by the
statute (provided the person is represented by at least ten practicing lawyers. GUATEMALA.
CONST. OF 1965, arts. 262-65.
16 BOLIVIA CONST. OF 1967, art. 127(5); CHILE CoNsT. or 1925, art. 86; COLOMBIA
CONST. OF 1886, art. 214; COSTA RICA CONT. OF 1949, art. 10; HAITI CONS'. OF 1964,
art. 121; HONDURAS CONT. OF 1965, arts. 234 and 235; PANAMA CONST. OF 1972, art.
188; PARAGUAY CONST. OF 1967, art. 200; URUGUAY CONST. OF 1967, arts. 256 and 257;
VENEZUELA CONsT. OF 1961. art. 215(3).
1974]
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B. Effect of a judicial Determination of Unconstitutionality
The effect of a judicial determination that a law or decree is uncon-
stitutional varies considerably throughout Latin America. In four coun-
tries, Chile, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the constitution specifical-
ly provides that a judicial declaration with regard to constitutionality
operates inter partes only.17 In Costa Rica, Guatemala\ and Panama, on
the other hand, the constitution specifically provides that a judicial declar-
ation of unconstitutionality has an erga omnes effect."'
In other Latin American countries the matter is more complex. In
Argentina, as in the United States, a judicial declaration that a statute is
unconstitutional is technically binding only upon the parties to the case.10
But the Argentines have developed a doctrine of stare decisis in constitu-
tional matters; the inferior courts are expected to adhere to all decisions
of the Supreme Court on constitutional matters.20  Hence, a decision by
the Argentine Supreme Court with respect to facial constitutionality tends
to have an erga omnes effect.
In Mexican constitutional litigatiofi a judicial determination of the
unconstitutionality of a statute affects only the parties. Indeed, the con-
stitution specifically withholds from the judiciary the power to make a
general declaration that a statute is unconstitutional. 2 ' But five consecu-
tive decisions of the Supreme Court or Collegiate Circuit Courts establish
a case law rule (jurisprudencia), which is binding upon the courts in
future litigation.2 2 Hence, as in Argentina judicial decisions that techni-
cally operate only inter partes can have more widespread effects.
In Brazil, El Salvador and Venezuela the effect of a judicial determi-
nation of unconstitutionality depends upon the procedure employed. In
17 CHILE CONST. OF 1925, art. 86; HONDURAS CONST. OF 1965, art. 237; PARAGUAY
CONST. OF 1972, art. 200; URUGUAY CONSI. OF 1967, art. 259.
18 COSTA RICA CONST. OF 1949, art. 10; GUATEMALA CONST. OF 1965, arts. 264 and 265;
PANAMA CONST. OF 1972, art. 188.
19 Lopez v. De Pedro, 248 Fallos "702 (1960); Anibal Abalos v. Provincia dc Mendoza, 255
Fallos 262, 263; 1963-IV J. A. 221 (1963). This is not true, however, in four of the provinces,
Chaco, Santiago del Estero, Neuquen and Rio Negro, whose constitutions give their high courts
power to nullify unconstitutional laws. SCe H. Fix ZAMUDIO, supra rote 12, at 31-32,
20 1 S. V. LINARES QUINTANA, DERECHO CONSTITUTIONAL E INSTITUCIONES POLITI.
cAS 666-68 (1970). Article 95 of the Peronist Constitution, in force in Argentina from 1949
to 1956, provided: "[Tlhe interpretation whkh the Court of Justice [Supreme Court] gives
to the articles of the Cons:itution ... shall be applied obligatorily by the national and provincial
courts." See generall) C. AYARRAGARAY. EFECTOS DE LA DICLARACION D11 INCONSTITU-
CIONALIDAD (1955).
There are, however, occasional examples in the case law in which lower courts have ex-
pressly refused to follow the Argentine Supreme Cour's constitutional decisions. E,g,, Admin.
istraci6n Gral. de Vialidad Nacional v. Fojticova Ie Feith, 108 La Ly 685 (Fed. Chain. App. La
Plata en bdnc 1962).
2 1 MEXICO CONST. OF 1917, art. 107(11) (amended 1968).
2 2 Mexican Ley de Amparo, arts. 192-194 (as amended, 1968).
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all three countries a determination of constitutionality in ordinary litiga-
tion operates only inter partes.' But in Brazil the Senate has been con-
stitutionally obligated to suspend, either in whole or in part, laws and
decrees which have been declared unconstitutional by final decision of the
Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal.24  Moreover, since 1964 the Supreme
Federal Tribunal has laid down a series of case law rules called S:hmulas,
which are binding upon the lower courts.* Since the rules enshrined in
the Shmula are generally followed, a decision of the Supreme Federal
Tribunal has an effect analogous to stare decisis.
Brazil, El Salvador, and Venezuela also have specialized procedures
through which an original action can be brought directly before the na-
tion's highest court to challenge the constitutionality of a statute on its
face. Called a representation (representafdo) in Brazil and a popular
action (acci6n popular) in El Salvador and Venezuela, these procedures
permit the supreme court to invalidate a statute with erga omnes effects.25
The representation and the popular action, which is also used in Colombia
and Panama, are discussed in greater detail infra.
7
II. PROCEDURES FOR RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Early drafters of Latin American constitutions were quick to include
a plethora of individual guarantees and rights within the ambit of con-
stitutional protection, but slow to develop techniques by which these
guarantees and rights could be implemented. Initially, perhaps, it was
hoped that merely setting out these rights in the constitution would be
sufficient to secure them from abuse,2 but subsequent events in most coun-
tries made it soon apparent that such thinking was hopelessly idealistic.
2 Brazil: Loumno JUNIOR, 0 CONTROLE DA CONSTrrUCiONALIDADr DAS I.Eis 116
(1957); El Salvador. 2 IL GALLARDO, LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE EL SALVADOR 189-90
(1961); Venezuela: Eder, supra note 6, at 611.
24 Article 42 (VII) of Brazil's 1969 Constitution provides:
It is incumbent upon the Federal Senate to suspend the execution, wholly or in part,
of any law or decree declared unconstitutional by final decision of the Supreme Fed-
eral Tribunal.
This measure gives the Senate "the task of rendering inoperative, erga omner, the laws and
norms which the Judiciary refrains from applying, in casu, because of the defect of unconsti-
rutionality." Vote of Minister Oswaldo Trigueiro in Engenharia Souza e Barker Ltda. v. Senado
Federal, RMS 16.512, 38 Revista Trimestral de Jurisprudincia [hereinafter cited as R.T.J.] 5,
10 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1966). The origins of this provision are traced in LOuREIRO JUNIOR,
supra note 23 at 118-24.
25 Generally, the Supreme Federal Tribunal will not enter a rule of law into the Sdsvuld
until the Tribunal has decided an issue the same way several times in succession.
2' Only in Venezuela is a statute invalidated by the popular action considered void ab
intio. In Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Panama a statute invalidated by representation
or popular action is treated as if it had been repealed. Eder, rupra, note 6 at 610-12.
2 7 See notes 89-99 infra and the text thereto.
28 Fix Zamudio, Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the lndividual, 9 J. INT'L
COMM'N JuRiSTS 60-61 (1968).
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A. Proliferation and Evolution of Habeas Corpus
1. The Brazilian Experience
The first procedural device for the protection of constitutional rights
and liberties to be utilized in the new Latin American republics was
habeas corpus, borrowed from the British by Brazil in its 1830 Penal
Code. 9 Before long Brazilians were stretching 'habeas corpus to cover
threats to personal liberty as well as actual restraints."0 By 1891 the
Brazilian concept of habeas corpus had evolved into a considerably more
versatile and potent procedure for preserving constitutional guarantees
and writs than its Anglo-American forebear. Article 72(22) of the Con-
stitution of 1891, Brazil's first republican constitution, provided:
Habeas corpus shall lie whenever an individual suffers, or is in imminent
danger of suffering, violence or coercion through illegality or abuse of
power.
"Illegality" was interpreted to include unconstitutionality, which made
habeas corpus a favorite technique fo challenging the constitutionality
of statutes and decrees. This popularity was largely the result of the
rapid, summary procedure employed in habeas corpus actions. Though
constitutional questions could be raised in ordinary litigation, the slow
pace of such suits sharply limited their utility in protecting individual
rights.
I By the 1920's habeas corpus suits were being brought to protect the
exercise of virtually every constitutional right. Brazilian judges granted
writs of habeas corpus to protect freedom of speech and assembly, as well
as political and electoral rights."' The writ was even granted to permit
minors to participate in carnival 3
The flood of habeas corpus cases began to overwhelm the Brazilian
courts. In 1926 a constitutional amendment cut back habeas corpus juris.
diction to cases in which there was actual or imminently threatened inter-
ference with an individual's power to come and go.33 But despite this
reform, Brazilian courts tend to construe their habeas corpus jurisdiction
quite broadly.34 '
29 1Eder, Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience, in XX'rIf CeNTURY
COMPARATIVE AN CONFLICrS LAw 463, 465 (K. Nadelmann et al. eds. 1961),
30 Id. at 466-69.
31id.
321d. at 468.
si ld. at 469.
34E.g., Vieira Netto, H.C. No. 45.232, 44 R.T.J. 322 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1968) (granting
habeas corpus against an order of a military judge suspending petitioners from practicing their
professions); Helena Sidou, H.C. No. 40.828, 65 R.T.J. 97 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1973) (denying
[Vol. 35
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2. The Peruvian Experience
The writ of habeas corpus has undergone even greater expansion
in Peru. Until 1916 habeas corpus in Peru was restricted to cases of il-
legal confinement of individuals, and no summary procedure existed to
protect other constitutional rights." Rather than create alternative pro-
cedures like mandamus or injunction, the drafters of Peru's 1916 "Aboli-
tion of Preventive Detention Law" decided to push the Brazilian expe-
rience one step further and expand habeas corpus to protect all individual
constitutional guarantees."' The 1920 Constitution restricted habeas cor-
pus to the ambit of personal liberty, but the concept of an expanded
habeas corpus was revived by Article 69 of the 1933 Constitution which
provides:
All individual and social rights recognized by the Constitution shall
be protected by the action of habeas corpus.
The result has been well summarized by Professor Cooper:
Habeas Corpus in the Peruvian legal system... now combines, although
as yet imperfectly, much of the character of the Juicio de Amparo of
Mexico and the Mandato de Seguridad of Brasil [sic). Legislative and
judicial interpretation of its nature has given it at least some of the char-
acteristics of the English remedies of Certiorari and Mandamus, with the
merest hint of the Injunction for good measure.37
Thus, habeas corpus has been utilized in Peru for such diverse purposes
as preventing the dosing of a publisher s or challenging the fairness of
an expropriation award pursuant to the Agrarian Reform Law.3 9
Like the Brazilians, the Peruvians found it awkward to use the sum-
mary procedure of habeas corpus to protect all individual rights ° But
the Peruvians did not develop a new procedural institution like the Bra-
zilian writ of security, discussed infra.41  Instead they subdivided habeas
corpus into two separate procedures: (1) personal liberty, which has con-
habeas corpus to a model who sought assurance that she would not be prosecuted for going
topless at the beach).
35D. GARCIA BELAUNDE, EL HABEAS CORPUS INTERPRETADO 11 (1971); Cooper,
Habeas Corpus in the Peruvian Legal Syjtem, 31 REVISTA DE DERECHO Y CIENcIAS POLITrCAS
297, 312 (1967).
3 6 1 aw No. 2223 of 1916, arts. 7 and 8.
'1r Cooper, supra note 35, at 332.
:18 RT, No. 132, July 21, 1934. at 181-82, reprinted in D. GARCIA BELAUNDF, supra note
,5. ;1t '0 -0-
39 RJP No. 263, December, 1965, at 1483-89, reprinted in D. GARCIA BELAUND, supra
note 35, at 307-11.
415 All habeas Lorpus suits had to be brought before the criminal courts until 1968. D.
GARCIA BELAUNDE, supra note 35, at 13.
41 See notes 48-51 and the text thereto.
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tinued as a summary procedure before the criminal courts; and (2) other
constitutional guarantees, which are provided a somewhat less summary
procedure in the civil courts.
42
One important difference between the Brazilian and Peruvian habeas
corpus is the effect of the court's determination of unconstitutionality.
In Brazil the writ can be used to challenge the constitutionality of a law
on its face, and courts occasionally have declared statutes unconstitutional
in habeas corpus proceedings. 3  While Peruvian courts may have this
power, they have never exercised it. Habeas corpus has been used in Peru
only to invalidate application of a statute or decree to a specific case, 44
Today, habeas corpus in its traditional sense, sometimes called amparo
de la libertad personal or recurso de amparo de la libertad is said to be
expressly or implicitly guaranteed in the constitutions of all the Latin
American republics. 45  However, enshrinement in the constitution does
not always signify observance in practice. Instances in which Latin Ameri-
can governments have failed to honor the privilege of habeas corpus are
legion.4" Indeed, in certain Latin American countries habeas corpus is
more often than not constitutionally suspended by invocation of a state
of siege-4
7
4 2 Decree-Law No. 17.083 of October 24, 1968.
4 3 E.g., Vieira Netto, H.C. No. 54.232, 44 R.T.J. 322 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1968).
44 Furnish, The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws: Context for Law and Development, 19 AM,
J. COMP. L 91, 101-104 (1971).
4 5 Fix Zamudio, note 28 supra, at 67.
46 See, e.g., Cooper, Habeas Corpus in Peru: Myth and Reality, 20 CLEV. ST. L. RuV. 603
(1971), who candidly asserts:
In fact, as a protection of basic human rights, the elaborate structure described is
quite useless and habeas corpus, in itself, is of no practical value as a guarantee against
arbitrary detention and procedural irregularities, however grave ....
Thousands of ordinary persons accused of common crimes are regularly kept for
quite long periods in police detention without being placed at the disposition of the
investigating magistrate in flat defiance of the law. This is the usual, indeed, the in.
variable practice, in the case of minor criminals, a fact readily verifiable by direct
enquiry. Id. at 608.
47 In the case of Manuel Rodriguez, 138 La Ley 770 (Fed. Cham. of Apps. of La Plata, 1st
Sala 1970), Judge Aramburis opinion observed that in Argentina,
From September 6, 1930. up to the present date, a person could have been de-
tained for 17 years, five months, and 18 days, for during that period, the state of siege,
as well as other more serious measures (like the Conintes Plan, the state of internal
war, martial law, etc.) was decreed no less than 11 times. On three of these occa-
sions, it was extended for several years in succession (1941/1945; 1951/1955; and
1958/1963).... A person born on September 6, 1930 .... could have been incar-
cerated for approximately 45 per cent of his total existence. During all this time
said person would have lacked all protection. Id. at 774-75.
A prime example of the abuse of the s:ate of siege is Paraguay, where a state of siege has
been almost continuously in effect since 1947 and has permitted the Stroessner regime to
rule dictatorially since 1954. For a formal condemnation of thi. tactic by the Paraguayan Bar
Association, see 28 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 51 (1966). See generally, INTER-AMJUI.
CAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE OAS, PRELIMINARY STUDY O THII STATE OF
SIEGE AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS (1961).
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B. The Brazilian Writ of Security
Several years of living with the more restricted form of habeas corpus
established by the 1926 constitutional amendment, discussed supra, con-
vinced many Brazilian lawyers that a summary procedure was needed to
protect constitutional rights which could no longer be fitted within the
ambit of habeas. Thus a new procedural institution, the writ of security
(mandado de seguranfa), was created in 1934. It combines into a single
writ the effective characteristics of the Anglo-American writs of prohibi-
tion, injunction, mandamus, and quo warranto. The writ of security will
lie to protect any "clear and certain right unprotected by habeas corpus,
irrespective of the authority responsible for the illegality or the abuse of
power."
48
The writ of security embodies three essential procedural advantages
that have made it a highly useful check on the activities of public author-
ities:
(1) It can function as an affirmative or negative injunction, com-
pelling an authority to perform or cease performing a particular act.
Previously, the courts lacked the power to nullify administrative acts; an
action for damages was ordinarily the only remedy.4 9
(2) It is a summary action that takes preference on court calendars
over all other actions except habeas corpus. (In theory, only 20 days
should elapse from the filing of the action to the date of decision, though
in practice this period is usually closer to three months.)
(3) The court may issue a preliminary injunction or restraining
order to preserve the status quo. Since the opportunities for delay in
ordinary litigation are numerous, such a stay is frequently of crucial im-
portance.
Unlike the Brazilian writ of habeas corpus, the writ of security cannot
be used to attack the constitutionality of a law on its face."10 After a writ
of security is conceded, the law simply may not be enforced against the
party that sought the writ, nor against similarly situated parties who may
have joined in the suit with him. Non-parties must bring their own writs
of security if the administrative authorities persist in applying the law to
them. However, if the Supreme Federal Tribunal sends to the Federal
Senate a copy of its decision conceding a writ of security because a law
or decree is unconstitutional, the Senate has the constitutional obligation
to suspend execution of such law or decree."'
4 8 BRAZIL CONST. OF 1969, art. 153 (21).
4 9 Buzaid, "Juicio de amparo" e Mandado de Seguranfa, 56 RE vsTA DA FACULDADE DE
DIREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE DE SAO PAULO 172, 218 (1961).
30 Simula No. 266 states: "The writ of security will not lie against a law in the abstract."
51 See note 22, supra. The thorny question of the extent of judicial power if the Senate
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C. The Mexican Amparo
Judicial protection of constitutional rights developed quite differently
in Mexico. Its Constitution of 1836 established a curious organ of gov-
ernment called the Supremo Poder Conservador (Supreme Conserving
Power) as guardian of the constitution. Comprised of five members
elected by the Senate, the Supremo Poder Conservador was granted the
power to nullify any law, executive act, or Supreme Court decision that
contravened the constitution. It was also granted the power under certain
circumstances to suspend the Supreme Court and Congress. In the event
of revolution, the Supremo Poder Conservador was responsible for re-
establishing the constitutional order. But the Supremo Poder Conservador
lacked its own army and could legally act only if requested to do so by
one of the three branches of government. It was called to action only
four times, none of which involved a defense of constitutional provi-
sions.2
No further progress towards implementing a remedy to protect con-
stitutional rights occurred until adoption of a new constitution in 1857.
The sharp contrast between the success of judicial review in the United
States and the failure to safeguard the constitution in Mexico convinced
the constitutional drafting committee that preservation of constitutional
rights was best entrusted to the judiciary. There was, however, consider-
able debate about how the judiciary should protect the constitution.
Rather than adopt the model of the United States, the Mexicans created
an original legal institution called amparo (literally, support or protec-
tion), a summary proceeding in the federal courts for protecting any con-
stitutional right. The framers of the 1857 Constitution sought to mini-
mize the political or legislative aspects of judicial review by providing:
The judgment [in amparo] shall only affect private individuals, being
limited to according them the relief and protection pleaded for in the
particular case, without making any general declaration as to law or act
on which the complaint is based.53
The hope was that with amparo operating in this fashion, "constitutional
issues would cease to be incitements to insurrection.' 
'4
refuses to comply arose recently in the case of Engenharia Souza e Barker Ltda. v. Scnado
Federal, 38 R.T.J. 5 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1966). There the Senate had suspended only part of a
state statute declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Federal Tribunal. The Tribunal re-
solved its dilemma by treating a petition for a writ of security .ts a ripiewentatioti attion (th(-
Procura'or General obligingly lent his approval) and abrogated the offending statute on its
own. See notes 96-99 infra and the text thereto for a discussion of the Brazilian representation.
52
R. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO. A STUDY Or Timli AhiPARO SUIT 6, 9
(1971).
53 MEXICO CONST. OF 1857, art. 102.
54 R. BAKER, supra note 52, at 36.
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The Mexican amparo is a very complex institution with many facets.
Sometimes it is used as a writ of habeas corpus or injunction; at other
times it resembles a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality or an
appeal. Like the Brazilian writ of security, the amparo is designed as a
speedy remedy. The petition can be rather informal. A personal appear-
ance by the plaintiff or his representative, or in an emergency, even a
phone call or telegram to the judge, will suffice. The judge then makes
a preliminary examination of the petition to see that it is in order and
notifies the responsible authority, requesting justification for the act and
setting the time and place for a hearing within thirty days. Although the
judge is supposed to act within twenty-four hours after receiving the peti-
tion, and the authority should justify its action within five days, in practice
these brief time limits tend to be rather elastic.' 5
The courts are strictly confined to the allegations of the petition. If
a party alleges that a statute is unconstitutional on one ground, and the
court believes that the law can be held unconstitutional only on another
theory not set out in the petition, the court must deny the amparo. How-
ever, deficiencies in particular petitions can be liberally corrected, such as
those concerning penal, labor, or agrarian matters, where the petitioner
is likely to be uneducated and ill-advised.
The Mexican amparo resembles the Brazilian writ of security with re-
gard to suspension of the challenged act. The Law of Amparo gives a
judge the power to issue i temporary injunction or stay whenever execu-
tion of the challenged act may result in an injury that will be difficult
or impossible to repair. In certain circumstances the amparo petitioner
must provide a bond or suitable guarantee against damages resulting from
issuance of the stay. However, the respondent may be able to avert the
requested stay by posting a counterbond.
Unlike the writ of security, the amparo will normally not lie against
discretionary governmental acts for an abuse of discretion. Recent case
law has begun to develop such a concept, but the doctrine is still in its
incipiency."6
There are really several different types of amparo. For our purposes,
it will suffice to subdivide amparo into two basic components: the legality
amparo and the constitutional amparo.
1. The Legality Amparo (Amparo de la Legalidad)
Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution of 1857 gave rise to the legal-
Fix Zamudio, Sintesis del Derecho de Amparo, in INSTrrUTO DE DERECHO CO.MPARADO,
I PANORAMA DEL DERECHO MEXICANO 105, 135 (1965).
,6 See Fix Zamudio, Judicial Protection of the Individual Against the Executive in Mexico,
2 GERICHTSSCHuTZ GEGEN DIE FXEKuTivE 713, 750-51 (H. Mosler ed. 1970).
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ity amparo. It contained a clause modeled after the due process clause
of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States: "No one
can be judged or sentenced except by laws passed prior to the fact and
exactly applied to it, by the tribunal that has previously established the
law." Before long this clause was being interpreted as establishing a
constitutional right to have the laws of the country corectly applied to
one's case. The Mexican Supreme Court began to review state court de-
cisions via amparo whenever there was a contention that a court had mis-
applied the law.
The Supreme Court's practice engendered considerable debate. Not
only did it open the floodgates to Supreme Court review of almost every
case, but it practically eliminated the power of the state courts to interpret
state law. Every question of state law was readily convertible into a
federal constitutional question.
In the 1917 Constitutional Convention judicial abuses of article 14
were criticized, but the new version of that article contained the following
clause: "In civil suits the final judgment shall be according to the letter
or the juridical interpretation of the law; in the absence of the latter it
shall be based on the general principles of law." Read literally, this
clause would appear to reaffirm a constitutional right to have all decisions
made correctly, in accord with the law, and that is precisely how the
Mexican Supreme Court has read it. Thus, the Court has continued to
exercise the power to review state court decisions whether or not they
involve "federal questions." Article 14 is a means of appealing, by way
of direct amparo, from the state courts to the Supreme Court in almost
any case. (The form remains that of an original action, but it is in effect
an appeal.)
This kind of amparo is known as the "legality amparo," or the am-
paro de la legalidad, and its effect is to centralize the interpretation of all
laws, state and federal, in the Supreme Court. While the interpretation
of facts is left with the state courts, ever) question of law is convertible
into a federal constitutional question.
The legality amparo may be either "direct" or "indirect." One who
feels that the final decision of a state or federal court incorrectly applied
the law to his case may institute an amparo action directly before an ap-
propriate chamber of the Supreme Court or the nearest Collegiate Circuit
Court, depending on the severity of the sentence, the importance of the
issue, or the monetary amount in conflict.
Indirect amparo may be brought against all other forms of illegal or
unfair acts of governmental authorities. This type of amparo is generally
brought to compel or prevent actions of nonjudicial governmental agents,
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such as prosecutors, police, or public administrators, though an indirect
amparo may be brought against a judge to challenge an unconstitutional
or unlawful act separate from the trial, such as issuance of an arrest war-
rant. Instead of bringing the amparo action directly before a chamber of
the Supreme Court, a complainant in an indirect amparo suit must first
bring his action before a federal district court. The district court's deci-
sion may then be appealed to the Supreme Court or a Collegiate Circuit
Court.
2. The Constitutional Amparo (Am paro contra Leyes)
The constitutionality of certain laws, including executive decrees with
the force of law, may be challenged on their face by means of a constitu-
tional amparo brought in the federal district courts. In contradistinction
to the legality amparo, where the issue is the correctness of the interpre-
tation or application of the law to the plaintiff's case, the constitutional
amparo is an attack on the law itself. Indispensable parties to the suit
are the President or Governor who signed the law, the legislature that
enacted it, and the departments that administer it. Only laws said to be
"self-executing" may be challenged by the constitutional amparo. In gen-
eral, laws are considered "self-executing" when their promulgation alone,
without any specific implementing act or application, requires immediate,
detrimental compliance with their terms, or when they delineate a specific
group to which their terms apply, e.g., an act imposing a tax on bachelors."
3. The Volume of Mexican Amparo Litigation
The legality amparo has been largely responsible for an enormous
backlog of cases in the Mexican federal courts. The large number of
amparo actions brought each year is striking."8 As early as 1919 the Su-
preme Court's backlog exceeded 2,000, and within four years it had in-
creased more than fivefold to 12,072 cases. The initial approach to deal-
ing with this ever-increasing backlog was mathematical-division and ad-
dition. A 1928 reform divided the Supreme Court into three chambers
(civil, criminal, and administrative), and increased the number of judges
from eleven to sixteen. A 1934 reform added a fourth chamber (labor),
and increased the number of judges to twenty-one. But despite these
reforms, by 1946 the Supreme Court's backlog had grown to 27,000
cases9'J Further reforms were necessary in 1967, when substantial por-
57 See R. BAKER, supra note 52, at 166-73.
-" From De(cmber 1969 to December 19-10 more than 53,000 new amparo complaints
wc.rc fild in th. fcderal district courts alone.
59 Tena Ramirez, La Reforma de 1968, en Materia Administrafira, al Poder Judida de a
Federacien, 1968 EL FORO, 55. 56 (1968).
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tions of the Supreme Court's backlog, which exceeded 20,000, were trans-
ferred to Collegiate Circuit Courts.
" I
There is also a substantial backlog of constitutional amparo cases.
As a result of amendments to the Law of Amparo made in 1958, the
Supreme Court was required to hear en banc all appeals involving the
constitutional amparo. The motivation for this measur6 appears to have
been the government's displeasure over the substantial amount of fiscal
and economic legislation that had been held unconstitutional by the Ad-
ministrative Chamber of the Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court
had a backlog of more than two thousand constitutional amparos and
had decided only eighteen of them in 1958, the result has been nearly
interminable delay in reaching final judgment."1
D. The Argentine Amparo
Prior to 1957 the Argentine courts afforded no generalized injunctive
relief against unconstitutional official action. The constitutionality of laws
and decrees could be challenged during the ordinary course of litigation,
but this procedure was often lengthy, arduous, and expensive. "2 The writ
of habeas corpus, known as the recurso de amparo de la libertad, gave
fairly rapid protection against illegal or arbitrary restraints on physical
liberty; however, there was no comparable remedy for speedy protection
of other constitutional rights. Aware of the dramatic expansion of the
writ of habeas corpus in nearby Brazil and of the extraordinary versatility
of the Mexican writ of amparo, Argentine lawyers quite naturally at-
tempted to utilize habeas corpus as a summary procedure to prevent denial
of other constitutional rights. But the Argentine Supreme Court refused
to permit such an expansion. In 1933 in the Bertotto case, 3 where a pub.
lisher sought habeas corpus to compel the postal authorities to accept his
newspaper for mailing, the Supreme Court declared:
The reform of 1951 tried a somewhat different approach to the problem. Part of the Su-
preme Court's amparo jurisdiction was transferred to multi-judge circuit courts, whose deci-
sions were non-appealable. A temporary Auxiliary Chamber, composed of five supernumerary
judges, was set up to decide cases until the backlog was eliminated. While these measures
reduced the backlog initially, by 1964 the Supreme Court was once again more than 10,000
behind.
60 See Schwarz, The Mexican Writ of Amparo: An Extraordinary Remedy Against Official
Abuse of Individual Rights, pt. II, 11 PUBLIc AFFAIRs REPORT (1970). Another feature of
the 1967 reforms was the establishment of an Auxiliary Chamber vhose judges could substitute
for absent regular judges, as well as whittle away at the backlog.
1 R. BAKER, supra note 52, at 72-73.
62 See Bielsa, Jurisdictional Protection and Other Remedies Against the Illegal Exercise or
Abuse of Administrative Authority, U. N., REMEDIES AGAINST TilE ABUSE oil ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AUTHORITY-SELECTED STUDIES 33, 57.60 (1964).
63 41 J.A. at 554 (1933).
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Neither in the letter, spirit, nor constitutional tradition of the institution
of habeas corpus does one find any basis for applying it to liberty of
property, commerce, industry, teaching, [or] transport of correspondence
Subsequent attempts to expand habeas corpus prior to 1957 also came to
naught65
After Per6n's ouster in 1955, the Supreme Court was ready to recon-
sider this position. The Per6n dictatorship had virtually emasculated the
court, impeaching all but one of its members in 1947.'Q When Per6r
was overthrown, General Lonardi's provisional government promptly re-
placed Per6n's obsequious appointees to the Court with jurists of inde-
pendent stature. It is probable that many years of living under a regime
in which arbitrary governmental action was commonplace convinced the
new judges of the necessity of a quick and effective judicial remedy to
guard against the recurrence of such abuses. Beginning with the Siri
case,"7 the Argentine Supreme Court set about fashioning such a remedy.
Like the Mexican amparo and the Brazilian writ of security, the Ar-
gentine amparo is a summary remedy that presupposes a patent violation
of the complainant's constitutional right. If there is a serious unresolved
issue of fact, amparo will not lie."" And, like the Anglo-American injunc-
tion, amparo will not lie if there is an adequate remedy at law.6 Though
as a general rule, amparo is not the proper procedure to have a law or
decree declared unconstitutional, the Argentine Supreme Court has re-
cently carved out an exception where the statute or decree is manifestly
unconstitutional."0
The Argentine amparo differs from the Mexican amparo and the Bra-
zilian writ of security in several significant respects. The Argentine am-
paro is much more an extraordinary remedy than the Mexican or Bra-
zilian procedures. In contrast to the Mexican and Brazilian high courts,
which hear several thousand amparo and several hundred writ of security
cases each year respectively, the Argentine Supreme Court decided an
04 Id. at 559.
6 See G. BIDART CAMPOS, REGIMEN LEGAL Y JURISPRUDENCIAL DEL AMPARO 46-53
(1968).
6; See generally Leonhard, The 1946 Purge of the Argentine Supreme Court of Jutics, 17
INTER-AM. EcoN. AFFAIRS 73 (Spring 1964).
67239 Fallos 459, 1958-11 J.A. 476 (1957).
';"The Arg, trints boittwed the Brazilian writ of security's requirement that the plaintiff
have a certain and incontestable right. However, in practice there have been situations in
which a mere legitimate interest has sufficed. G. BIDART CAMPOS, tpra note 65, at 317-18.
'i Fanipinella, 1961-11 JA. 62, 102 La Ley 312 (Fed. Charb. of the Cap., Cont.-Admin.
Div. 1959).
7 0 j. Carlos Outon, 267 Fallos 215, 1967-Il J.A. 369 (1967).
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average of only 22.5 cases per year, from 1957 to 1969." t  Unlike the
Mexicanamparo, which is frequently utilized as a substitute for appeal,
the Argentine amparo will not lie against judicial actions.1 2  Nor will the
Argentine amparo lie to challenge the validity of taxes,13 whereas such
challenges constitute a substantial part of Mexican amparo and Brazilian
writ of security cases.
Only in one respect is the coverage of the Argentine amparo signifi-
cantly broader than that of the Mexican amparo and the Brazilian writ of
security. The Argentine amparo can be used to challenge the actions of
private parties;74 the Mexican and Brazilian remedies contain a limitation
analogous to the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.7
E. Proliferation of Amparo
A number of Latin American countries besides Mexico and Argentina
have adopted the amparo as a device for protecting constitutional guaran-
T1 Calculated from data in Vocos Conesa, La Demanda de Amparo on la Jurisprudencld
do la Corte Suprema Nacional, 1969 REsENAS J.A. 790.
7
2 G. BiDART CAMPOS, supra note S5, at 261-64.
73 Aserradero Clipper, S.R.L., 249 Fallos 221, 1961-Il J.A. 108 (1961).
74 Samuel Kor, S.R.L., 241 Fallos 291, 1958-I J.A. 216 (1!)58). The military govern.
ment attempted to bar such amparo actions when it promulgated a statute codifying the law of
amparo. Law No. 16.986 of October 18, 1966. However, the courts have not been willing
to concede that the legislature has the power to curtail the constitutional remedy of amparo
and have continued to grant amparo against the acts of private parties like labor unions. E.g.,
Diaz Colodrero, 1967-11 J.A. 356 (Nat'l Cham. App!s. of Peace of the Fed. Cap. 1966).
The omission with respect to acts of priva:e individuals in Law 16.986 was partially recti.
fied in the federal Civil and Commercial Procedural Code, Law No, 17.454 of September 1967,
Article 321 expressly provides for amparo against acts or omissions of individuals which injure
constitutionally protected righ's. However, this procedural code does not apply to the pro.
vincial courts, nor does it apply to certain specialized federal tribunals, such as the labor courts,
criminal courts, or those which deal wi;h crimes against the economy. G. BIDART CAMPOS,
supra note 65, at 109-10, 115-17. For a general discussion of the implications of Laws
16.986 and 17.454, see Note, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Protect Constittttional
Rights in Argentina, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 831 (1970).
75 Mexican Ley de Amparo, art. 73; Brazilian Law No. 1.533 of Dec. 31, 1951, art. 1.
The Mexican amparo has a peculiar feature that is in some respects inconsistent with this
"state action" limitation. In certain cases the complainant in an amparo suit can be the gov-
ernment. Article 9 of the Mexican Ley de Amparo provides:
Official juridical entities may request amparo against the conduct of functionaries
or representatives who determine the laws when the complained of act or law affects
[the complainants'] patrimonial interests.
Thus, the Labor Chamber of the Mexican Supreme Court has sustained the right of the govern.
ment to bring an amparo suit against awards of the Tribunal of Arbitration dealing with
public employees. Apindice do .arisprudencia de la Suprema Corle, Tes 451 at 8"5. Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court has held that the government may request amparo against adverse
judgments in nationalizaion or expropriation matters. Ap~ndhe de Jurhprudenct a de d
Suprema Corte, Tess 450 at 872-74. Amparo's functioning as a substitute for appeal results
in this incongruous reversal of normal roles in which the defendant is really the private party,
although technically a court is named as the defendant.
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tees.,6  In Costa Rica, "- El Salvador," and Panama, amparo functions
as a summary remedy to protect individual constitutional rights which are
not protected by habeas corpus. Venezuela should perhaps be included
within this grouping, but the present state of its law with respect to am-
paro is confusing.8
In Honduras"' and Guatemala 2 amparo serves a dual function: (1) as
a summary remedy to protect individual rights not protected by habeas
corpus, and (2) as a means of securing a speedy judicial declaration that
a law or regulation does not apply to the plaintiff due to its unconstitu-
tionality.
As a matter of form, the Nicaraguan amparo is closest to the Mexican
amparo, theoretically serving the functions of habeas corpus, protection
of individual rights other than physical liberty, and challenging unconsti-
7 6 The procedural idiosyncracies of amparo in the various Latin American countries are
described in Camargo, The Right to Judicial Protection: "Amparo" and Other Latin Ameri-
can Remedies for the Protection of Human Rights, 3 LAwYER OF THE AMERICAS 191, 211-16
(1971); Fix Zamudio, Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the Individual, 9 J.
INT'L CoMm'N JuRIsTs 60, 77-86 (1968); J. OTHON SIDOU, DO MANDADO DE SEGURANCA
131-78 (3d ed. 1969). The multiplicity of usages ascribed to amparo in the Hispanic-Ameri-
can legal lexicon is explored in Fix Zamudio, Diversos Significados Juridicos del Amparo en el
Derecho lberoamericano, 18 BOLETIN DEL INSTIT=TO DE DERECHO COMPARADO DE MbXICO
119 (1965).
"7 COSTA RICA CONST. OF 1949, art. 48; regula:ed by Lay de Amparo, Law No. 1161 of
June 2, 1950, as modified August 9, 1952.
78 EL SALVADOR CONST. OF 1962, art. 221; Ley de Procedimientos Constitudonales of
Jan. 14, 1960, arts. 12-18.
,9 PANAMA CONST. OF 1972, art. 49; regulated by Lay sobre Recursos Constitucionales y
de Garantla, Law No. 46 of Nov. 24, 1956. Of all the amparo stautes, this is the most sum-
mary. The respondent authority is required to inform the court of its position within two
hours after no:ification of the complaint and to suspend execution of the impugned act immedi-
ately. Arts. 48 and 49. Decision is to be rendered within two days. Art. 52.
80 VENEZUELA CONST. OF 1961, art. 49 (III) provides:
The courts shall protect (amparardn) every inhabitant of the Republic in the en-
joyment and exercise of the rights and guaranties established by the Constitution,
in conformance with the law (ley). The procedure shall be brief and summary, and
the proper judge shall have the power to restore immediately the infringed juridical
situation.
Unfortunately, the legislature has never passed implementing legislation. When in 1962 a
litigant sought amparo, the Superior Court held that it had no power to concede amparo in the
absence of implementing legislation. Gutibrrez y Guti rrez, 5 JURISPRUDENCIA VENEZOLANA
165 (1962). SevLn ycars later, the same court reversed itself and granted amparo despite the
absence of a regulatory s:atute. Manuel Beja N6iiez en solicitud de Recurso de Ampsto, 22
JURISPRUDENCIA VENEZOLANA 39 (1969). Ste also Procurador General de ]a Rep6blica
en Recurso de Amparo a Favor tie F. WVytack, 30 JL'RISPRUDENCIA VENEZOLANA 466 (Sup.
Ct. 1971 ).
81 HONDURAS CONST. OF 1965, art. 58; Le) Constitucional de Amparo of April 14, 1936.
82 GUATEMALA CONST. OF 1965, arts. 78-84; Ley Constitutional de Amparo, habeas corpus,
) cota u,t,nalidad of Aptzl 28, 1966.
b3 See Gonzilez Pirez, El Processo de Amparo en Af ijico y Nicaragua, 5 REVITA DE AD-
MINISTRACION PUBLICA 297 (1954).
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tutional laws or decrees."' Nicaragua also, in theory, permits amparo to
challenge the constitutionality of a law on its face.8
Three other Latin American countries adopted the amparo, at least
as a matter of form, in 1967: Bolivia,"0 Paraguay,8" and Ecuador.88
F. The Popular Action
In 1910 Colombia instituted an extraordinarily simple procedure called
the "popular action" (acci'n popular)."" It permits any citizen (defined
loosely by the case law to include corporations and even aliens), without
regard to personal stake in the outcome or exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to bring an action challenging the constitutionality of any law
on its face directly before the Colombian Supreme Court by filing a sim-
ple written statement setting forth the asserted conflict between the law
and the constitution. The Procurator General must then file an opinion
within 30 days; however, since the popular action is not considered an
adversary proceeding, the Procurator's role is more analogous to an amicus
curiae than to a respondent.
The action goes directly to the constitutional chamber of the Supreme
Court for an opinion and statement, which must be rendered within thirty
days. No briefs or oral arguments are presented, and the action takes
preference on the Court's calendar. The Supreme Court sits en banc,
exercising original and exclusive jurisdiction. The Court is not limited
to the complainant's theory of the case; if it believes the law unconstitu-
tional for reasons other than those set out in the complaint, the Court has
the duty to invalidate the law. If the law is declared unconstitutional,
the Court's decision has an erga omnes effect. However, technically this
does not mean the law is annulled or that rights acquired under the law
are invalidated. It simply means that the law cannot be enforced against
anyone. The Court's decision is nonappealable and cannot be reviewed
in any later proceeding."
The popular action before the Colombian Supreme Court is limited
84 Ley de Amparo of Nov. 6, 1950, which, according to article 323 of the Constitution of
1950 (amended 1962), is a constitutional law. This Nicaraguan statute is peculiar in that it
considers habeas corpus as part of amparo, yet on occasion refers to the institution of habeas
corpus.
85 Ley de Amparo of Nov. 6, 1950, art. 5.
86 BOLIVIA CONST. OF 1967, art. 19.
8 7 PARAGUAY CONST. OF 1967, art. 77.
8 8 ECuADOR CONST. OF 1967, art. 28(15).
89 COLOMBIA CONST. OF 1886 (as amended), art. 214(2). Sea Grant, Judicial Control of
the Constitutionality of Statutes and Administrative Legislation in Colombia: Nature and Evoltt.
tion of the Present System, 23 S. CAL. L RE V. 484, 499-504 (1950).
90 L. SACHICA, CONSTITJCIONAUSMO COLOMBIANO 124-29 (2d ed. 1966).
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to challenge of any public law or decree-law in force. Regulatory or ad-
ministrative decrees or acts must be challenged before the Council of
State, the highest administrative courtY1
With slight modifications the popular action has spread to El Salvador,
Panama, and Venezuela." From 1931 until 1959 Cuba permitted the
popular action, but required a petition signed by twenty-five citizens in-
stead of an individual complaint. 3 Peru provides for a popular action to
challenge the constitutionality of governmental decrees and regulations
(but not laws); however, the Peruvian courts have not permitted its use.04
Brazil permits a popular action for the sole purpose of "annulling acts
injurious to the patrimony of public entities." 5
G. The Brazilian Representation
Brazil has a procedure for challenging directly before the nation's
highest court the constitutionality of any statute on its face."0 Called a
"representation", this action has been used primarily as a check on the
actions of state legislatures and governors rather than to protect the con-
stitutional rights of individuals. Originally, this direct actiori was limited
to challenging state statutes which offended the principles of a republican
91 The Supreme Court has been roundly criticized for carving out two limitations on its
broad jurisdictional grant: (1) laws approving treaties may nor be challenged by popular ac-
tion, (2) nor will the Court inquire into the procedural formalities with which a law was passed.
F. DEPAULA PEREZ, DERECHO CONSTIYUCIONAL COLOMBIANO 446-49 (5th ed. 1962).
However, in comparison with practice in other countries, these limitations upon the exercise of
the power of judicial review seem quite minor. Consequently, one would imagine that the
Supreme Court has been overwhelmed wi:h popular actions, but apparently this has not been
the case. The two-volume work of NESTOR PINEDA, JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE
LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA (1963), which purports to collect all of the constitutional
decisions of the Supreme Court sitting en banc from 1910 through 1962, contains only 329
cases. Three of these cases deal with permission for the Executive to leave the country, twenty-
five deal with proposed legislation that has been vetoed by the President on constitutional
grounds. Of the 301 popular aclions, the Colombian Supreme Court avoided reaching the
merits in seventy-six. In 100 of the some 225 popular actions decided on the merits, the Court
declared the challenged legislation unenforceable (inexequible), either in whole or in part.
A review of the cases involving contract claims appears in Grant, "Contract Clause" Li'iZasion
it! Colombia: A Comparative Study in Judicial Review, 42 AM. POL SCL REV. 1103 (1948).
9 2 EL SALVADOR CONST. OF 1962, art. 96; PANAMA CONST. OF 1972, art. 188; VENE-
ZUELA CONST. OF 1961, art. 215 (3, 4). (Though not dearly set out in these constitutional
provisions, the popular action has long been part of Venezuelan constitutional practice.) See
1 P. PINEDA LEON, LECCIONES ELEMENTALES DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 33 (2d ed.
1964); H. FIX ZAMUDIO, supra note 12, at 76.
93 Camargo, supra no'e 76, at 199. Camargo erroneously states that the popular action
was suppressed in Cuba's Fundamental Law of 1959. The popular action was formally pre-
served in Article 172(b) of the Fundamental Law; however, in practice it has disappeared
along with the entire institution of judicial review.
.14 Furnish, supra note 44, at 107-10.
95BRAZIL CONST. OF 1969, art. 153(31); regulated by Law No. 4.717 of June 29, 1965.
90 BRAZIL CONST. OF 1969, art. 119(1).
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form of government.97 Only in December, 1965, as a result of a sugges-
tion made by Victor Nunes Leal, then a member of the Supreme Federal
Tribunal, was the representation expanded to permit challenge of "any
federal or state law or normative act . .9.8.08
The representation still differs from the popular action in one im.
portant respect: standing. The popular action can be brought by any citi-
zen, but the representation can be instituted only by the Procurator Gen-
eral." But the Procurator General is selected by the President, who, since
1964, has been selected by the military. The constitutionality of laws and
acts which the military does not want challenged must be tested by some
procedure other than the representation.
H. Anticipatory Judicial Review
In addition to the popular action and judicial review during the course
of ordinary litigation, Colombia has utilized a third technique to permit
the judiciary to insure the constitutionality of legislation. Whenever a
bill has been passed over a presidential veto based on the ground that the
bill, either in whole or in part, is unconstitutional, the bill is sent directly
to the Supreme Court for resolution of the constitutional issues. The
Court must render its decision within six days after receipt of an opinion
from the Procurator General. Only if the Court sustains the bill's consti-
tutionality may it be promulgated as law. This technique of anticipatory
judicial review was first introduced into Colombia in the Constitution of
1886, which borrowed the idea from the Ecuadorian Constitutions of 1869
97 The 1946 Constitution authorized the federal government to intervene in state activities,
inter alia, to acsure observance of the following princip!es: (1) republican form of govern-
menr, (2) independence and harmony of powers; (3) temporay nature of elective oflices
(which are limited to the terms of corresponding federal officers); (4) prohibition of governors
and mayors immediately succeeding themselves; (5) municipal autonomy; (6) rendering of
administrative accounts; (7) guarantees of the judicial power. Art. 7 (VII). Article 8 em-
powered the Procurator General to submit to the Supreme Federal Tribunal any state act
which he deemed offensive to the above constitutional principles.
98 CONST. amend. XVL
The representation is similar to a nineteenth century Colombian system of judicial review,
set out in COLOMBIA CONST. OF 1863, art. 72, which provided:
The Supreme Court shall suspend, by unanimous vote, on petition of the Procurator
General or of any citizen, the enforcement of the legislative acts of the state as.
semblies, insofar as they may be con:rary to the Constitution or laws of the Uilion, re-
porting in each case to the Senate so that the latter may decide definitively as to die
nullity or validity of said acts.
99 Citizens may petition the Procuratoi General to institute a representation, but if he re.
fuses to do so, they have no recourse. M.D.B. v. Procurador-Geral da Reptblica, Reclama¢io
No. 849, 59 R.T.J. 333 (Sup. Fed. Trib. en bane 1971).
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and 1878.1"' The procedure is also presently employed by Costa Rica,
Ecuador, and Venezuela. 101
From 1970 to 1973 a variant of the Colombian form of anticipatory
judicial review was in force in Chile. The Constitutional Court, created
in 1970, was empowered to determine, prior to their becoming law, the
constitutionality of bills submitted to Congress and decrees with the force
of law issued by the president."'" Those bills and decrees legitimated by
the Constitutional Court could not later be declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, and those invalidated by the Constitutional Court
could not become law.
10 3
I. Review by Special Jurisdictions
Though strictly speaking not part of judicial review, there are several
special jurisdictions operating in Latin America independently or semi-
independently of the regular judiciary that afford considerable protection
against arbitrary or illegal government action. Two such special jurisdic-
tions bear mentioning: (1) administrative tribunals, and (2) Chile's
Contraloria General.
1. Administrative Tribunals
Several countries, most notably Colombia and Uruguay, have adopted
the French system of establishing separate administrative tribunals, called
Tribunales de lo Contencioso Administratiro. In Uruguay the adminis-
trative tribunals have the power to confirm, suspend or annul arbitrary or
illegal administrative acts, though they lack the power to modify such acts.
Nor do they have the power to award damages; such redress must be
sought in the regular courts.04
In Colombia, however, the administrative courts can award damages
or modify an administrative act, as well as annul, confirm, or suspend it.
Colombia's administrative court structure is highly developed, with its
own code, and generally offers much speedier relief than the ordinary
courts.0 5 The highest administrative court is the Council of State, the
100 Grant, Judicial Review by Executive Reference Prior to Promulgation: The Colombian
Experience, 21 S. CAL. L REv. 154, 155 (1948).
101 COSTA RICA CONST. OF 1949 (amended 1963), art. 128 (a two-thirds vote is necessary
to reject a bill on constitutional grounds); ECUADOR CONST. OF 1946, art. 67, as amended
CONSr. OF 1967, art. 151; VENEZUELA CONST. OF 1961, am 173.
102 Note 14 supra.
103 CHILE CONST. OF 1925, art. 78(c) (amended July 1971).
104 URUGUAY CONST. OF 1967, arts. 307-13; Vescovi, La Proteccidn Proceirl de la Gar.
antias Individuales en Am&ica Latina, 18 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DEREcHo Y CiEK-
ciAs SOcIALEs 218, 230-31 (1967).
105 E. SARRiA, DEREcHO ADMINSTrRATIVO 346-64 (4th ed. 1962).
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government's supreme consultative body, which exercises both judicial and
executive functions. Since it is often difficult to determine whether a case
should be heard by the regular or administrative courts, Colombia has
found it necessary to set up a Conflicts Court to resolve such jurisdictional
disputes.1 6
2. Chile's Contralorla General
Chile has a unique administrative-judicial agency called the Contra.
lort'a General (Office of the Comptroller General). Created originally
in 1927 to serve as watchdog of the nation's budget, the Contraloria has
evolved into a presidential watchdog, which passes on the legality and
constitutionality of all presidential decrees executing laws, or which in-
volve the collection or disbursement of public funds or administrative
personnel. However, rejected decrees may, in certain instances, be reis-
sued by a process called a "decree of insistence," signed by all members
of the Cabinet.
10 7
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LATIN AMERICA:
AN EXERCISE IN DIALECTIC
Is judicial review in Latin America an institution that exists only in
constitutional and procedural texts, or is it a meaningful part of the "law
in action"? What functions does judicial review perform in Latin
America and how effectively does it perform them? Do Latin American
courts actually prevent unconstitutional actions in matters deemed "im-
portant" to the executive?
The answers to these and related questions are facile only for coun-
tries like Haiti or Paraguay, where few would claim that judicial review
exists in fact. But for most Latin American countries the answers to such
questions are varied and complex, as the following dialogue suggests.
Q-Isn't it senseless to talk about judicial review in Latin America? This
is a region where lawyers, with good reason, quip: "Constitutions,
like virgins, are born to be violated." Effective judicial review pre-
supposes an independent judiciary, an institution conspicuously ab-
sent from Latin America.
A-Judicial independence is highly relative. One cannot assert that courts
are simply independent or nonindependent. Not even the United
106 S.WEURFEL; FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN COLOMBIA: LAWS AND POLICIES 289-91 (1965).
The variation in administrative court structure is described in H. CLAGETr, ADMINISTRATION
OF JusIcE IN LATIN AMERICA 59-75 (1952).
107 F. GIL, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CHILE 97.99 (1966); C. GBYwiTz, ELEMENTOS
DE DBREcHo CONSTrrTIONAL CHILENO 541-49 (1963).
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States Supreme Court, which is generally considered a model of judi-
cial independence, can ignore political realities for long and survive
intact. The United States Supreme Court has had to back off from
confrontations with the political authorities many times.
Q-For example?
A-Ex parte McCardle'08 and Korematsu v. United States'' are two cases
which leap quickly to mind. And you recall F.D.R.'s famous "court-
packing plan," which produced the notorious "switch in time that
saved nine."' 10
Q-But surely no Latin American judiciary enjoys the kind of political
independence enjoyed by the United States judiciary. Can you imag-
ine a Latin American court daring to decide cases like the Pentagon
Papers..' or Steel Seizure' 1 2 against the government?
A-I can imagine an Argentine or Brazilian court doing so. The courts
of these countries have regularly displayed considerable indepen-
dence. Even during de facto military regimes, the Argentine and
Brazilian high courts have not hesitated to declare unconstitutional
measures important to the military governments then in power.' a"
The exercise of the power of judicial review in this fashion after a
military coup d'9tat strikes me as requiring greater courage and inde-
pendence than that displayed by the United States Supreme Court
in the Pentagon Papers and Steel Seizure cases.
Q-But look what has happened to the Argentine and Brazilian courts!
Since 1945 the Argentine Supreme Court has been impeached en
masse once,"' summarily dismissed en masse twice,"15 and has re-
108 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
109 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
] 0 See R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); 1 P. FREUND
et aL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND OTHER PROBLE11S 243-44 (2d ed. 1961); Mason,
Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE L J. 791 (1952).
II' New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
112 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
113 E.g., in 1945 the Argentine Supreme Court invalidated three decrees of the de facto
Per6n government: one had changed the eminent domain valuation procedure (38 La Ley 87),
a second had established a new court (38 La Ley 50), and the third had ordered the transfer of
a federal judge (38 La Ley 53).
After the coup of March 31, 1964, the Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal ordered re-
leased on habeas corpus such notorious enemies of the revolt as Francisco Juliio, leader of the
Peasant Leagues in the Northeast, HC 42.560, 36 R.T.J. 565 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1965); Miguel
Arraes de Alencar, former Governor of the State of Pernambuco, HC 42.108, 32 R-T.J. 614
(Sup. Fed. Trib. 1965); Jos6 Parsifal Barroso, former Governor of the State of Cearl, HC
41.609, 34 R.T.J. 351 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1964); and Mauro Borges, former Governor of the
State of Goias, HC 41.296, 33 R.T.J. 590 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1964).
114 In 1946 a Per6n-dominated Congress impeached all but one of the members of the Ar-
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signed en masse once.11  The Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal
has been played like an accordion. The military arbitrarily expanded
the size of the Tribunal in 1965 and contracted it in 1968.117 More-
over, everything connected with national security has been withdrawn
from judicial review by military fiat.""
A-Appearances can be deceiving in changes of court personnel. The
entire Peruvian Supreme Court was replaced by a military regime in
1968, yet the reconstituted Supreme Court appears to be more
independent and able than its predecessor."" There is no doubt
that the 1957 dismissal of Per6n's sycophantic appointees substan-
tially irproved the independence and quality of the Argentine Su-
preme Court. 20
Q-Still you would not deny that the independence of the Argentine and
Brazilian courts has been sharply reduced by the extraconstitutional
changes in government?
A-That evidence is by no means clear. After all, the constitutional rem-
edy of amparo was devised by members of the Argentine Supreme
Court appointed by the military regime that deposed Per6n in
1955.2 The creation of the amparo was in large part a response
to the constitutional abuses of Per6n's constitutionally elected gov-
ernment. In 1967 a Supreme Court appointed by a de facto mili-
tary regime courageously resisted an attempt by that regime to curtail
gentine Supreme Court. See generall) Leonhard, The 1946 Purge of the Argents'ne Supreme
Court of Justice, 17 INTER-AMER. ECON. AFFAIRS 73 (Spring 1964).
115 In 1957, following Per6n's ouster, the Lonardi provisional government summarily cash-
iered the entire Supreme Court. This process was repeated in 1966 by the military government
headed by General Ongania. See generally, INSTITUTO DE CIENCIA POLITICA, LA REVOLU-
iotN ARGENTINA (1966).
116 Following the election of a Peronist regime in 1973, the entire Supreme Court re-
signed. The new regime promptly filled the vacancies with Percnistas. La Prcnsa, May 25,
1973, at 10, cols. 1-3; La Prensa, June 9, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
117 Pursuant to Article 6 of Institutional Act No. 2 of Oct. 27, 1965, the military regilme
expanded the number of ministers Irom 11 to I(. Pursuant to ln'tinutional Act No. 5 of De.
cember 13, 1968, three ministers of the Supreme Federal Tribunal were compulsorily re-
tired. The President of the Tribunal, Ant6nio Gon alves de Oliveira resigned in protest
After another minister resigned because of age, Institutional Act No, 6 of February 1, 1969, re-
duced the number of ministers on the Tribunal from 16 to 11.
118 Institutional Act No. 5 suspended the writ of habeas corpus for all political crimel
against national security, as well as crimes against the economic and sodal order or the populal
economy. Institutional Act No. 6 elimir.ated ordinary appeals to the Supreme Federal Tribuna
from deciginn of the military tribtinals in , rim( iw v,!% ing I,dti'onal sccurity, as well as utrni
back on the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear appeals in Laes denying tht writ ol scturity.
119 Furnish, supra note 44, at 109; Cooper, Peru's "New Look" Judiciary, 55 Jun)I A
TURE 334, 337 (1972).
120 For an account of th, ,.m.naln., l,.havio Ih . a., opp,.,n th trg nIma SJ
preme Court, see Orgaz, Pudcr Juduial, in ARGENTINA 1930-1960, 124 J, Paita ed, 1961).
12 1 See note 67 supra and the text thereto.
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its amparo jurisdiction.'" The Court showed further evidence of its
independence the following year by invalidating Law 17.642, which
imposed certain duties on the Court in connection with impeach-
ment tribunals for the provincial judiciary. Acting stta sponte, the
Court unanimously issued an accord stating that it would not comply
with the statute because it exceeded the powers of the military gov-
ernment and was "incompatible with the federal principle of govern-
ment established in the National Constitution and recognized by the
Statute of the Revolution.....l Shortly thereafter, the Court di-
rectly confronted the Executive by declaring unconstitutional an exec-
utive decree closing down a periodical.'" Indeed, one can make out
a good case for the proposition that the Argentine Supreme Court
has been more independent under de facto governments than under
de jure governments in the past three decades.
The military government that seized power in 1964 in Brazil
originally made no attempt to interfere with judicial independence.
Only after the Supreme Federal Tribunal had freed by writ of habeas
corpus a number of important "enemies of the Revolution"'12 and the
Tribunal's President had publicly denounced the military regime '-
was the decision made to pack the Tribunal. Even then the govern-
ment did not pack the Court with hacks; among the new appointees
were Aliomar Baleeiro, a distinguished tax scholar, who two years
ago publicly criticized the military government for failing to main-
tain the rule of law, and Adaucto L6cio Cardosa, who had resigned
as President of the Congress in 1965 in protest against the Execu-
tive's quashing the mandates of six Representatives.
Packing and unpacking the Supreme Federal Tribunal has not com-
pletely compromised its independence. The Tribunal has invalidated
portions of the military regime's draconic national security law" - and
freed numerous student radicals on habeas corpus in December of
1968, "a move that greatly upset many in the military."'1 8 Far more
damaging to effective judicial review was the military's arbitrary with-
drawal of jurisdiction from ordinary courts over cases involving po-
1 2 2 J. Carlos Outon y otros, 267 Fallos 215, 1967-11 J.A. 369 (1967).
t23 1968-11 J.A. 118, 121 (1968).
124 Sfinchez Sorondo ("Azul y Blanco"), 1968.IV J.A. 56, 130 La Ley 450 (1968).
125 See note 113 supra.
126 He invi:ed the military to return to their barracks and give the nation back its govern-
ment. Rtported in Veja, Dtc. 18, 1968, at 23.
1 2 7 Vieira Netto, H.C. No. 45.232, 44 R.T.J. 322 (1968).
128 R. SCHNEIDER, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF BRAZIL 272 (1971).
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litical rights and crimes against national security.'" The judiciary
had little choice but to go along, for this restriction had been imposed
by "institutional acts," the functional equivalent of constitutional
amendments. But as soon as a change in underlying constitutional
provisions permitted reassertion of jurisdiction, the Brazilian Supreme
Federal Tribunal displayed some of its traditional' independence. 180
Q-Have de facto governments respected court decisions with which they
disagreed?
A-In Argentina and Brazil the decisions of the highest courts have al-
most invariably been respected.' 1 However, decisions of the state
and lower courts have not always been accorded similar treatment.
8 2
Q--Why should de facto regimes feel bound by a court decision declar-
ing their actions unconstitutional?
A-Legitimation is as much a function of judicial review as invalidation,
perhaps even more so. 13 3  Legitimacy has been in scarce supply in
Latin America ever since Napoleon sought to place his brother
Joseph on the Spanish throne. 13 A revolution or golpe exaccer-
bates this chronic "crisis of legitimacy." In seeking to institutional-
ize a golpe, political leaders not infrequently seek to bolster their
regime's legitimacy by judicial declaration. But a court that can
only legitimate can confer considerably less legitimacy than a court
that also has the power to invalidate. The Argentine Supreme Court
129 See generally Carl, Erosion of Constitutional Rights of Political Offenders in Brazil, 12
VA. J. INT'L L 157 (1972).
130 For example, when the 1969 redraft of the 1967 Constitution restored the Supreme
Federal Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear ordinary appeals from military tribunals in cases involv-
ing civilians accused of crimes against national security, the Supreme Federal Tribunal quickly
exercised this judisdiction to reverse the conviction of Caio Prado J6nior, an eminent Marxist
economic historian, for violation of the National Security Law. R.O.C. No. 1.116, 59 R.TJ.
247 (1971).
131 There are only three cases in Brazilian legal history in which the executive openly de-
fied a Supreme Federal Tribunal decision: the first occurred in 1911, the second in 1915, and
the third in 1939. L. BITTENCOURT, 0 CONTROLE JURISDICONAL DA CONSTITUCIONALI-
DADE DAS LEIS 136-38 (2d ed. 1968).
132 For example, in 1968 provincial courts in Santa Fe, Argentina, issued writs of amparo
to protect the right of a committee on university reform to meet. The police ignored the am-
paro writs and assaulted a group at one of the banned meetings. Among the victims of the as-
sault was a judge who had issued an amparo writ. The Supreme Court of the Province is-
sued a declaration concerning the need to respect court orders. The federal government re-
sponded by intervening in the province to reorder the judiciary, whereupon the entire Santa
Fe Supreme Court resigned. Argentina: Subjection of the Judiciary, 35 BULL. INT'L COMM'N
JURISTS 13 (1968).
133 C. BLACK, TI-E PEOPLE AND THE COURT 223(1960).
134 Morse, The Heritage of Latin America, in TH4E FOUNDING OF NEW SOCIETIES 123,
158 (L. Hartz ed. 1964). Professor Horowitz refers to illegitimacy as the norm in Latin
America. The Norm of Illegitimacy: The Political Sociology of Latin America, in LATIN
AMERICAN RADICALISM 3 (1. Horowitz et al. eds. 1969).
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has developed the practice of issuing accords legitimating de facto
governments in return for a promise by the leaders of the golpe to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.35
Q-But the Court's own legitimacy must stem from the Constitution. If
a regime has come to power by violating the Constitution, what
kind of legitimacy can the Court confer on that regime?
A-Perhaps in the final analysis a revolution must legitimate itself. But
most Latin American golpes do not make drastic changes in the courts
or the constitution. It is as if the constitution had a broad severa-
bility clause with respect to the provisions regulating elections and
successions. Indeed, some Latin American constitutions even pro-
vide for their own survival in the event of a revolution.13 6
Q-Don't the courts encourage political instability by sanctioning and
legitimating governments which have come to power through extra-
constitutional means?
A-You recall Judge Learned Hand's statement: [A... ] society so riven
that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save;.., a society
where the spirit flourishes, no court need save; . .. a society which
evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of
that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.' 13
7
Q-That statement should be viewed in light of Professor Hart's reply:
What the sentence assumes is that there are two kinds of societies-one
kind, over here, in which the spirit of moderation flourishes, and another
kind, over here, which is riven by dissension. Neither kind, Judge Hand
says, can be helped very much by the courts. But, of course, that is not
what societies are like .... A society is a something in process-in pro-
cess of becoming. It has always within it, as ours does, seeds of dissen-
sion. And it has also within it forces making for moderation and mutual
accommodation. The question- the relevant question-is whether the
courts have a significant contribution to make in pushing... society in
the direction of moderation-not by themselves; of course they can't save
us by themselves; but in combination with other institutions.'38
A-The courts cannot prevent a coup d'tat. A former member of the
Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal made the point emphatically:
135 E.g., 158 Fallos 290 (1930), 196 Fallos 6 (1943), 82 La Ley 398 (1956). TheBra-
zilian Supreme Federal Tribunal similarly recognized the golpe that originally brought Getfilio
Vargas to power, 55 Revista Forense 359 (1930), but has not made this a regular practice.
136 E.g., MExICO CONST. OF 1917, art. 136; VENEZUELA CONST. OF 1961, art. 250;
HONDURAS CONST. OF 1957, art. 340.
137 The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF LIB-
ERTY 172, 181 (L Dilliard ed. 1952).
138 Comment, in GOvERNMENT UNDER LAW 139, 140.41 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956).
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Ag-aihst -a successful armed insurrection, only a more forceful counter-
insurrection will "be valid,-and this -cannot positively be made by the Su-
preme Court wfio 'would not be so naive as to quell an insurrection by
means of a worthless declaration of principles. . . Against the historical
fatalism of military uprisings the Judicial Power is of no avail. This is
the truth of the matter and it cannot be denied by such as seem to think
'that instead of an arsenal of Law books, the Supreme Court has an ar-
senal of shrapnels and torpedoes available.139
By conditioning. judicial recognition of a de facto regime upon its
'promise to respect constitutional guarantees the judiciary is doing all
that it can to preserve juridical order during revolutionary chaos. No
causal relation between the frequency of golpes in Argentina and the
practice of the nation's Supreme Court in recognizing de facto regimes
has ever been established.
Q-Isn't a court asking for trouble by pretending to be a de jure institu-
tion in a de facto regime? I can't think of a clearer example of
what ought to be a non-justiciable political question than whether a
revolutionary movement is in- control of sufficient force to assure
peace and order in the nation.
A-A court might be headed for even more trouble if it refused to treat
a revolutionary government as the legitimate government of the
nation.
Q-Have Latin American courts developed a "political question doc-
trine" to avoid potentially damaging conflicts with other branches of
government?
A-Some Latin American courts have highly developed techniques for
avoiding certain types of politically perilous questions. For example,
except for passing on the validity of de facto regimes, Argentina's
political question doctrine resembles that of the United States Su-
preme Court. 4 ' Brazil's political question doctrine appears slightly
narrower than that of the United States, 4 while Mexico's is much
broader.1 42
In addition, most courts treat questions arising from the suspen-
sion of constitutional guarantees during states of seige as nonre-
13 9 Nelson Hungria, quoted in Basilio, Judicial Power as a Gumantee of Individual Rightj:
Parallel Competence of the Legislative Power and the Judicial Power, in INTER-AMER. BAR
Assoc,, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH CONFERENcE 205, 211 (1957).
140 S. AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 85 (1943).
141 See A. WALD, Do MANDADO DE SEGURANCA NA PRATICA JUDICIARIA 202-08 (3d ed.
1968).
142 chwarz, Judges Under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United States and
Mexico, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 260,286 (1973).
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viewable political questions.143 Conflicts are also reduced by the lack
of erga omnes effects attributable to most judicial declarations of
unconstitutionality.'44
Q-Doesn't the ease with which constitutional guarantees can be sus-
pended by invocation of the state of siege render much of Latin
American constitutionalism illusory?
A-There is no denying that the state of siege is much used and much
abused in many Latin American countries,4 5 but this is by no means
true for all of Latin America.'4"
Q-Is there any empirical data to support the proposition that judicial re-
view is an effective check on unconstitutional governmental action
in Latin America?
A-A recent study of the Costa Rican amparo found that the Supreme
Court granted the requested relief in 15.4 per cent of the 195 cases
between 1950 and 1962.147 Examination of the decisions of the
Colombian Supreme Court reveals that the Court invalidated, either
wholly or in part, the challenged law in 100 out of the 225 popular
actions decided on the merits. 48 And a recent study of the Mexican
amparo by Gonzilez Casanova found that in cases in which the Mexi-
can President has been named as a defendant, the courts granted
the requested relief in a little more than 1200 (thirty-four per cent)
of the 3700 cases.' 49
Q-But do these statistics really tell us anything significant? How im-
portant were the challenged laws or acts to the government? How
manr of the cases involved the same law or act? How many of the
143 C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 89 (1948). Although Argentine courts
have refused to pass on the reasonableness of the declaration of siege, they have been gradually
developing a willingness to review the reasonableness of particular acts of detention or dosings
of periodicals effectuated during a s ate of siege. See e.g., Ricardo Alberto Canovi, 278 Fallos
337 (1970); Primera Plana v. Gobierno Nacional, 7 J.A. 301 (Ser. Cont. 1970), 138 La Ley
464 (Sup. Ct 1970).
144 See notes 17-27 supra and the text thereto.
14 5 See note 47 supra and the text thereto.
146 The study by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reveals no record of a
declaration of a state of siege during 1950-1960 in four Latin American countries: Mexico,
Honduras, Panama, and Uruguay.
4 7 E. GUIER, SENTENCIAS DE AMPARO 2 (1969).
14 - See I & 2 N. PINEDA, JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE
JUSTICIA t 1963). According to this study, there were only 329 cases from 1910 through 1962
involving en banc constitutional decisions of the Colombian Supreme Court. Three dealt with
permission of the executive to leave the country, and twenty-five concerned legislation vetoed
on constitutional grounds. In seventy-six of the remaining popular actions, the Supreme Court
avoided the merits.
149 p. GONZALEz CASANOVA, DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO 21-24 (1970).
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challenges to important laws were ducked on procedural grounds?
How many patently unconstitutional laws were sustained? How
many statutes were rewritten through judicial interpretation to avoid
constitutional difficulties?
A-These questions are impossible to answer without much more sophis-
ticated data. Certainly the percentage of cases decided against the
government alone fails to convey much of the flavor of judicial re-
view and in some instances can be quite misleading. For example,
Mexican presidents are automatically included as parties in all con-
stitutional amparo actions. That the president was named as a party
is simply a formality rather than an indication that the amparo in-
volved a matter important to the government.
A more sophisticated analysis of Mexican data appears in Carl
Schwarz's article, Judges under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in
the United States and Mexico."' After noting that the Mexican Su-
preme 'Court has been granting amparo relief in roughly half its
penal cases, Schwarz astutely observes that the Court's independence
in criminal matters is a mixed bag. ". . . I'T]he Penal Chamber,
more readily than the Administrative Chamber, appears to withdraw
to its 'passive virtues' when confronted with politically sensitive is-
uses."'' Thus, when confronted with challenges to the constitution-
ality of the controversial "social dissolution" law or the confinement
of hundreds of students without trial after civil disturbances in 1968,
the Mexican Supreme Court and the lower courts denied amparo
petitions.
152
On the other hand, in ordinary day-to.day Mexican criminal pro-
ceedings, there is much evidence that amparo proceedings provide a
vitally important means for correcting errors and abuses.' 53 And in
areas such as challenges by small farmers to confiscatory actions of
agrarian reform commissions, taxation, or rights of aliens, the Mexi-
can courts have broadly upheld challenges to governmental arbitrari-
ness.1
54
Q-Isn't the flavor of judicial review in Mexico quite different from that
of the United States, or even Argentina or Brazil?
A-The flavor is quite distinct. Rarely, if at all, have the Mexican fed-
eral courts used their amparo jurisdiction to fashion important sub-
150 3 CAL. W. IN'L L J. 260 (1973).
1511d. at 322-23.
152 Id. at 323-24.
153 Id. at 325.
15 Id. at 332.
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stantive limitations upon governmental power such as the U.S. courts
have done with due process, equal protection, or the commerce clause.
Almost all of the case law rules (jurisprudencia) laid down by the
Mexican Supreme Court deal with narrow, technical aspects of con-
stitutional and statutory interpretation. Political realities and a more
passive judicial tradition have precluded a creative, policy-making
role for Mexican judges.15'
Q-The reputation of the Mexican judiciary for corruption is notorious.18 6
How can one be confident that cases which appear to be exanples
of judicial independence are not simply the result of judicial corrup-
tion?
A-One cannot, except perhaps on the Supreme Court level. Of course,
the problem of corruption is by no means limited to Mexico, or even
Latin America. Recent investigations of the judiciary in parts of the
United States have uncovered similar problems. Nevertheless, the
problem appears to be more overt in certain Latin American coun-
tries. For example, the judicial system in Colombia practically broke
down completely during the early 1960's because of corruption and
inefficiency. Formal charges were filed against fourteen of the twenty
members of the Supreme Court for failing to discharge their judicial
responsibilities.' One simply has to look closely at individual cases.
Q-But even if one looks at specific cases involving matters obviously im-
portant to the government, it is difficult to reach any general conclu-
sions about judicial independence and the effectiveness of judicial
review. For example, take a recent Brazilian cause cdltbre involving
government censorship of the press. In 1971 a suit was brought by
the MDB, the Brazilian opposition political party, to compel the
Procurator General to institute a representation action challenging
the constitutionality of a 1970 decree-law imposing prior censorship
of books and periodicals. The Supreme Federal Tribunal denied the
155 See R. Baker, supra note 7, at 253-54.
156 Professor David Helfeld, former dean of the University of Puerto Rico Law School,
candidly observed in a recent article:
A pervasive characteristic of the Mexican legal system is the exent of corruption.
... Corruption starts at the federal level and permeates large segments of the po-
litical and judicial structure. Bribery, in the form of gift.giving, is part of the na-
tional political tradition, and only supreme-court justices are relatively immune to
its effects.... The net effect of this pervasive corruption is that a significandy large
number of cases are not judged on their own merits, short of a supreme-court de-
cision. Law and Politics in Mexico, in ONE SPARK FRO?,i HOLOCAUSr: Tm CRISIS
IN LATIN AMERICA 81, 91 (E. Burnell ed. 1972).
157S. WURFEL, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN COLOMBIA: LAWS AND POLICES 296-302
(1965).
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requested relief,""5 which provoked the dramatic resignation of Au-
dacto Cardosa, one of the ministers appointed by the military in
1965.159
On the surface this case would seem to indicate that the Brazilian
high court has been so cowed by the military that judicial review has
become ineffective. But such an interpretation is Inuch too simple.
The decision turned on a procedural issue: whether the Procurator
General had to institute a representation proceeding any time any
person requested him to do so. Quite properly the Tribunal held
that the representation was committed to the discretion of the Pro-
curator General. This was consistent with previous decisions of the
Tribunal.'6 ° And a contrary holding would have deprived the Tribu-
nal of its "passive virtue"-type techniques for avoiding constitutional
clashes,' as well as the benefit of opinions by the lower courts. Nor
did the Tribunal foreclose the possibility of eventual judicial review
of the decree-law; this was simply left to ordinary proceedings or
writ of security.-'
2
Q-Are there, then, any definite conclusions one can reach about judicial
review in Latin America?
A-Perhaps only some tentative conclusions can be offered. Judicial
review clearly functions as an important check upon unconstitutional
governmental action in a number of Latin American countries,
though in others it functions not at all. It is probably no accident
that judicial review has been most important in the federal systems
of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, for unchecked unconstitutional
action by state or regional governments poses a serious threat to the
continuation of a federal system. One very important role of judicial
review is to ensure that state or provincial governments conform to
the federal constitution.
158 MDB v. Procurador-Geral da Repdsblica, Reclamaio No. 849, 59 R.T.J. 333 (Sup.
Fed. Trib. en banc 1971).
159 In resigning, Cardosa stated publicly:
I believe that with the present decision the direct action for the declaration of uncon-
stitutionality is dead. In the conditions now prevailing in the country, no private
party will dare contest the constitutionality of laws of a political nature. One can
do that only through a representation via the Procurator General. And he has be.
come the person who decides . . . whether the representation will proceed. This is
the equivalent to making the Executive the judgc ot the constitutionality of tht law%
Quoted in the Estado de Sio Paulo, March 11, 1971 at 1, cols. 2.4.
160 E.g., Engenharia Souza e Barker Ltda. v. Senado Fedcral, RNMS 10.512. 38 R.T.J, 5,
20 (1966) (statement of Victor Nunes Leal, author of the proposal to expand representation).
I6 See generally Bickel. The Supreme Court,1960 Term-Fortuord: Tht, Pastia' Virtiiej,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
162 38 R.T.J. at 350.
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Judicial review is a fragile and sensitive institution. The Latin
American experience shows the delicacy with which it must be exer-
cised and the potentiality for disastrous conflicts that its exercise
entails. The experience of Argentina and Brazil in particular sug-
gests that courageous judges can make a substantial contribution in
nudging governments of doubtful legitimacy towards greater commit-
ment to underlying constitutional values, but that they are ultimately
doomed to failure without clear societal commitment to the con-
stitutions the courts are seeking to preserve.
